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This paper attempts to reconcile two models for sustainable economic growth in developing 
countries. I develop an empirical and theoretical case for how the geographic landscape 
of a country determines the ease with which it can assimilate foreign technologies and 
establish institutions favorable to economic growth. I explore the threshold between the 
seemingly conflicting geographic (Sachs et al.) and institutional (Acemoglu et al.) theories, 
and economic growth. I do this by developing a technologically determinant, intermediate 
bifurcation where growth shifts from being geographically to institutionally driven after 
enough technology has been assimilated. My analysis finds that the rate of technological 
assimilation is determined by the landscape of a country. As the technology level increases, 
income level converges toward the level of developed countries. After reaching a certain 
threshold, however, the primary driver of economic growth appears to shift from geography 
to institutions. 
The goal of economic development is to ensure that people enjoy prosperity and opportunity, leading productive lives without worrying about survival. Once-
poor countries that experienced economic growth were those that successfully 
assimilated and incorporated technology into their economies.1 This is because 
an economy that effectively utilizes computer, mechanical and other technologies 
is better positioned to have a competitive advantage. Technology is a predomi-
nately non-excludable good that helps workers become more productive. Given 
two workers with the same human and physical capital allocations, the worker 
with better access to technology should be more productive. As demonstrated by 
American economist and Nobel Laureate Robert Solow, economic growth cannot 
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be achieved purely by an influx of physical capital because of the diminishing 
returns of capital toward income. Solow insists that technology is the means 
to raise the permanent income level of an economy.2 Robert Barro and Xavier 
Sala-i-Martin found that most of the technology that helps developing countries 
converge to the income level of developed countries is technology created in the 
developed world and then diffused into the developing world.3 With these two 
themes in mind, the general question of “Why do some countries develop faster to 
enjoy higher levels of income?” becomes “What helps 
a country adopt technology faster than others, thus 
stimulating growth?”
While the technology level of a country can be 
an endogenous factor, explaining why some coun-
tries converge more quickly than others, the theories 
of Solow, Barro and Sala-i-Martin provide no clear 
explanation as to why certain countries acquire tech-
nology and put it to use in their economies faster 
than others. 
Two existing theories may provide an explana-
tion: the institutional theory, broadly associated 
with Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James 
Robinson, and the geographic theory, broadly asso-
ciated with Jeffrey Sachs and John McArthur. The 
institutional theory attributes economic growth to 
the legal and economic institutions already estab-
lished within a country.4 Conversely, the geographic 
theory, while acknowledging the important role 
played by institutions, asserts that the geography of a country (e.g., resource 
endowment and climate) is the direct, dominant factor in its development.5 While 
on the surface the two theories appear conflicting, they are not incompatible. The 
empirical analysis below demonstrates a bifurcation between the two theories, 
wherein a country develops and economic growth goes from being largely driven by 
geographical factors to being largely driven by institutional factors. This dynamic 
threshold, incorporating both Acemoglu and Sachs, corresponds to a switching 
model that I explore in this paper.
What role do institutional and geographic theories play in the assimilation of 
technology for the sake of economic growth? As mentioned, the ability of a devel-
oping country to converge with its developed counterparts is largely a function of 
how well it can assimilate technology. I assert that the rate at which technology 
is assimilated is determined by the landscape of the country: the more geographi-
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cally disadvantaged the country’s landscape, the more difficult it is to bring in new 
technologies and the less likely it is to develop quickly. As the technology level 
increases within a country, the income level converges toward the level of devel-
oped countries.6 However, after reaching a certain threshold, economic growth 
appears to shift from being geographically driven to institutionally driven. 
BACKGROUND
There is little debate that good governance and 
the rule of law are key to maintaining a prosperous 
economy. Fair institutions are essential to the man-
agement of a thriving economy.7 As Acemoglu states, 
“good economic institutions provide ‘secure prop-
erty rights’ for a broad cross-section of society.”8 
Proponents of the institutional theory assert that 
institutions established during the colonial era are 
largely responsible for the current plight of many 
countries and that these effects dominate geographic 
factors.9 Places that were not conducive to settlement 
did not accumulate large enough amounts of human 
capital to establish healthy institutions. However, the 
institutional theory of growth attempts to draw direct 
linkages between economic growth and institutions 
established nearly two hundred years ago and may 
discount the current importance of geographic factors. 
On the contrary, the geographic theory asserts that 
geographic factors are the direct linkage to economic 
growth and dominate institutional factors in its promotion or limitation.10
However, neither the institutional theory nor the geographic theory appear 
complete. The geographic theory does not explain the recent economic pros-
perity experienced by areas that previously suffered from what were considered 
geographic disadvantages such as land-locked Botswana and desert economies 
like Dubai. Likewise, Acemoglu admits that even the institutional theory lacks 
“crucial comparative static results” to explain why equilibrium economic institu-
tions differ.11 
Although geography may not directly determine aggregate economic level, it 
may set the tipping point for when an economy will transform from an agrarian 
economy to a sustainable manufacturing and service-based one. This is because 
geography can dictate the level of difficulty associated with incorporating tech-
nology into the economy. Examining this tipping point—if one exists—may provide 
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a quantifiable threshold at which economic systems go from unfavorable to favor-
able behavior or, in this case, from stagnant to positive growth. Such a threshold 
could have significant policy implications, which will be discussed later.
This paper explores when and how an economy uses technology to transition 
from a developing country to one with a standard of 
living and life expectancy largely indistinguishable 
from wealthier, more developed countries.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND LINKAGES
Countries that used to be geographically and/or 
institutionally disadvantaged have risen to the path 
of sustainable growth despite their historical endow-
ments. I will explore two examples to illustrate the 
case.
The first question is, how does a land-locked 
country such as Botswana overcome its geographical 
disadvantage and reach a path to sustainable growth? Second, how can a city in 
the middle of a desert, such as Dubai, rise from the sands to become an economic 
epicenter? In each case, investment in technology helped overcome geographical 
challenges. 
The geography of a territory or, more specifically, the landscape of a territory, 
is a key factor in determining how quickly healthy institutions are likely to be 
established for economic growth. Geographic landscape is defined as the terrain 
of the territory that can be characterized by exogenous factors such as access to 
waterways and coastline. However, my analysis shows that after a certain threshold 
of development, countries previously dependent on geographic factors to explain 
income level shift to a model of income growth that is primarily determined by 
institutions. 
I argue that the tipping point is determined by how easily the landscape of the 
territory allows for the assimilation and utilization of technology. As technology is 
adopted in a territory, factors such as lower transportation costs and higher indus-
trial productivity increase the competitive advantage of the region. Institutions for 
the maintenance of urbanization and commerce then organically develop to help 
elevate the economy to a higher steady state level. In other words, as a country 
rises in aggregate income level, institutional factors begin to play a larger role than 
geographic factors in explaining the income level. 
The facilitator of this transition is the technology level of a country. The dif-
ficulty in transferring and assimilating technology due to geographic factors offers 
one explanation for the link between the geography of a territory and the type of 
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institutions that thrive. Institutions may work more effectively depending on the 
level of technology in a region. To give one example, tasks such as keeping and pro-
cessing records can be done more efficiently with computer technology. Without 
technology, this task would require mounds of paper records and a specialized staff 
to maintain them. As a second example, a region with technological infrastructure 
such as power lines and roads finds it easier to establish institutions governing 
that territory and economy because technological infrastructure is the foundation 
for further technological innovation—for instance telegraph lines and railroads. A 
treacherous landscape may hinder the assimilation of technologies that can lead 
to advanced institutions.
In the case of a land-locked country like Botswana, airplanes, an extensive 
highway system and other transport technology have helped lower the costs of 
doing business, rendering Botswana’s economy more competitive. Despite lacking a 
coast, its landscape is quite conducive to technology transfer. It is a flat, semi-arid 
country roughly the size of Texas that is mostly covered by the Kalahari Desert 
and whose landscape consists of desert and savanna.12 
Our second case study, Dubai, was a relatively small port before 1990 that 
flourished into a modern metropolis in the desert with an unprecedented number 
of skyscrapers.13 This transformation would not have been possible without 
advances in available construction technologies, making building in a desert loca-
tion like Dubai possible. Though Dubai has benefited from a certain geographical 
advantage with its access to the Persian Gulf, the financial institutions that make 
it the financial epicenter in the region today did not fully develop until the import 
of technology and the development of the infrastructure required to support those 
technologies. 
Although it is true that Botswana and Dubai utilized their natural resources 
as a source of investment, this paper assumes that the source of the investment is 
largely exogenous to growth. While investment can theoretically originate from 
oil revenue, diamond revenue or even World Bank loans, the way investment is 
used to help a country assimilate new technologies is what is actually crucial to 
development and growth.
Lastly, countries afflicted with malaria were considered largely unsuitable for 
development until the discovery of quinine as a remedy. Quinine is an example of 
a technology that, once assimilated into an afflicted region, relieved the geographic 
disadvantage and removed a barrier to development.14
DATA, EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND ASSUMPTIONS
The empirical challenge of this study is to find indicators reflecting four dif-
ferent stages of advancement toward sustainable growth, as defined in Tables 1
Nima Veiseh
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Table 1: Each Theory is the Predominant Force Behind Each Stage of 
Development
Theory Type Stage -1 Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2
Economic 
Development 
Stage
Agricultural, 
rural economy
Bifurcation 
Threshold
Manufacturing, 
urbanized 
economy
Self-sustained 
economic 
development
Theory Type Geographic 
Theory
Institutional 
Theory
Research and 
development-
based economy
Below is a table illustrating the missing causal link between the two theories. 
On either side of the tipping point, either factor may be the most significant in 
explaining the aggregate wealth level of a country. 
Table 2: How the Geographic and Institutional Theories Are Reconciled through 
the Tipping Point
Theory Type Stage -1 Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2
Institutional 
Theory
Geography 
determined 
which colonial 
institutions were 
established.
Colonial institutions 
have perpetuated 
until today.
Economic growth 
determined 
by these 
institutions.
Geographic 
Theory
The geography 
of a region is 
the predominant 
factor.
Economic 
stagnation/
growth 
determined by 
geography.
Bifurcation 
Causality
The geography 
of a region is 
the predominant 
factor.
Geography 
of a region 
determines 
how easy it 
is to transfer 
technology.
Technology 
transferability 
to a region, as 
determined by 
its geography, is 
the determinant 
of what kind of 
institutions were 
established.
The 
subsequently 
established 
institutions are 
the determining 
factor in today’s 
economic 
growth.
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and 2. This issue is addressed by examining existing data and extracting different 
indicators that can be used to create composite metrics reflective of the unique 
states we are quantifying.
Four types of indicators are used to evaluate a given territory at each of those 
four different stages. These four indicators were chosen after conducting a factor 
analysis of sixty-one geographical, technological, institutional and economic 
indicators. The rationale for the final eight indicators chosen is described in this 
section.
First, indicators are required to measure how viable a territory is for tech-
nology transfer. For a territory to be favorable to technology transfer, it must have 
several properties. The two primary properties are the ability to easily navigate by 
land or water as well as the ability to install infrastructure for supporting develop-
ment. Three indicators signal how conducive a territory is to technology transfer: 
ratio of water area to land area, ratio of coastline length to total area and ratio of 
waterways to land area. Each indicator is exogenous and reflects the state of the 
territory as it is in its steady state.
Each of the three geographic-landscape indicators offers an important measure. 
First, the ratio of water area to land area indicates how plentiful water supplies are 
in proportion to the land area. The higher the ratio, the more water is available 
for key industrial processes and societal uses. Second, the ratio of waterways to 
land area indicates how much access the internal area of a region has to navigable 
waterways. Navigable waterways are important for transportation of both raw 
materials and finished goods. Third, the ratio of coastline length to land area indi-
cates how much access the land territory has to the coast. A high ratio of coastline 
will make it easier to transport technologies and goods via the sea to the territory 
in question.
Also needed is an indicator measuring the level of technology transferred into 
the territory. My primary indicator of measuring technology assimilation and 
usage is the number of mobile phone subscribers per hundred people. Previous 
work by Easterly and Levine using a similar indicator supports this as an adequate 
measure of technology level.15 I assume that the more technology utilized by a 
population, the higher its technology level.
A variable measuring how institutions have developed in a territory is also 
required. This is clearly a challenge because institutional and infrastructure indica-
tors are certainly endogenous. Instead, I use indicators to measure how progressive 
the institutions are. I assume that institutional progress can be seen in several 
ways. For example, female participation in government could indicate how pro-
gressive government institutions are.16 Likewise, the rule of law and protection of 
property rights are viewed positively by those seeking to conduct commerce.17
Nima Veiseh
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Three variables are used to measure institutional progress. The first is the 
number of days required to start a business. If a country has functioning institu-
tions, then starting a business should be a relatively smooth process; anyone with 
motivation, capital and a good idea should be able to do business. Starting a busi-
ness is a function not only of the competence of the people working at the institu-
tion, but also of how effective communication is among the institutions required 
to start the business. I assume that it takes more than one institution to start a 
business and that the time it takes to start the business is ultimately a function of 
the quality of the institution’s workers and competence. 
Second, I use the Rule of Law indicator created by Freedom House, which 
evaluates on a 1 to 16 scale—1 representing least rule of law, and 16 being most 
stable rule of law.18 The measure is based on four factors: independence of the judi-
ciary, primary rule of law in civil and criminal matters, accountability of security 
forces and military to civilian authorities, and equal treatment under the law. This 
indicator helps us gauge the strength of the judiciary and rule of law in a given 
territory. I assume that a strong and fair rule of law is a consequence of healthy 
institutions. 
Lastly, the percentage of seats in parliament held by females is an indicator of 
the heterogeneity and the progressive nature of institutions governing a territory. 
This paper assumes, based on work by Esther Duflo, that heterogeneity is a posi-
tive indicator of institutional progress due to the resulting diversity of ideas and 
citizens working within that institution.19 As a corollary, I also assume that the 
proportion of females in parliament is correlated with gender diversity in other 
institutions within the country.
THE BASIC MODEL
The basic model is composed of two sets of variables. Each set is meant to 
describe a factor that may contribute to economic growth, i.e., geographic (βs) and 
institutional (δs) variables, so that we can examine if a bifurcation exists between 
our two different sets of indicators:
Yi = α0 + ∑ βi Xi  +  ∑ δj Xj + εi
In this case, the geographic variables—ratio of water area to land area, ratio of 
coastline length to total area, ratio of waterways to land area—are represented by 
the βi coefficients, while the δj coefficients represent the institutional variables—
number of days to start a business, rule of law and percentage of seats in parliament 
held by females. The six indicators illustrated in the previous section are chosen 
out of a total of sixty-one unique indicators that endogenously and exogenously 
Reconciling Acemoglu and Sachs
FALL/WINTER 2010 | 213
describe the condition of a country. 
The basic model takes the following form, with definitions of the terms 
below:
Yi  = α0 + β1*ln(X1) + β2*ln(X2) + β3*ln(X3) + δ4*ln(X4) + δ5*(X5) + δ6*(X6) + εi
Yi: Dependent variable is the natural log of income per capita. Since this vari-
able exhibits skewness, I took the log of the dependent variable.
α0: Constant is the natural log of income for countries in the sample, which 
represents what remains if all other indicators are set to zero and their impacts are 
removed from the model.
β1: Coefficient for waterway density—square kilometers of waterway per square 
kilometer of land area. I took the natural log of this indicator because of its skewed 
nature as a ratio. I then normalized the log such that the minimum value was 
zero.
β2: Coefficient for coastline density—kilometers of coastline per square kilo-
meter of total area. I took the natural log of this indicator because of its skewed 
nature as a ratio. I normalized the log such that the minimum value was zero.
β3: Coefficient for water area to land area density—square kilometers of 
water area per square kilometer of land area. I took the natural log of this indi-
cator because of its skewed nature as a ratio. I normalized the log such that the 
minimum value was zero.
δ4: Coefficient for average time to start a business in days. I took the natural 
log of this indicator because of its skewed nature.
δ5: Coefficient for the rule of law, as gauged by Freedom House.
δ6: Coefficient for percentage of parliamentary seats held by females. 
RESULTS
I ran six models to examine which variables best explain the income per capita 
of a country. In Model 1, I examine how the primary indicators—three geographic 
and three institutional—explain the variance in per capita income level for all 
countries. I found that all six variables are significant at the 15 percent level, with 
four of six statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
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In Model 2, by reducing the sample to countries with less than $10,000 income 
per capita, all three geographic factors are significant at the 10 percent level, while 
only two of the institutional factors are.20 This illustrates that, in the initial gesta-
tion of an economy, both geographic and institutional makeup are important in 
explaining the variance in income. 
In Model 3, when I reduce the sample by excluding very poor countries—where 
income is smaller than $1,000 per year—all three institutional indicators are sig-
nificant while none of the geographic indicators are statistically significant.21 I 
interpret this to mean that countries that have assimilated enough technology and 
created infrastructure will experience low enough transportation costs and high 
enough industrialization levels such that geographic boundaries will not stand in 
the way of achieving a higher comparative advantage. 
In Models 4 through 6, I re-ran the regressions by excluding members of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose endowment 
of natural resources tend to be larger and not reflective of the landscape of the 
country. Excluding OPEC countries from our sample helps to remove outliers that 
are physically advantaged not by their surface geography, but by the assets they 
hold underground. Even while excluding them from the model, the story is still 
consistent with the description of Models 1 through 3.
INTERACTION BETWEEN GEOGRAPHIC AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
For robustness, this section explores the interaction of the geographic variables 
with the institutional factors.
The following specification is designed to examine whether there is significant 
interaction between the geographic and the institutional indicators. This is done 
by creating a dummy variable from a geographical indicator such as coastline 
density. The dummy variable has a value of one when a country is considered to be 
dense with coastline and zero if a country is considered to be less dense with coast-
line. All countries that are in the top 50 percent of coastline density are assigned 
the value of one; otherwise countries receive a value of zero. Let X7 represent the 
dummy variable, and μ represent the coefficient on the interaction term.
The general form of the second specification appears as follows, where I run 
the regression against each of the three institutional indicators. The example below 
shows how X3 has been transformed into the geographic dummy variable X7 and an 
interaction term is created with the institutional variable X4:
Yi = α0 + β1*ln(X1) + β2*ln(X2) + β3*(X7) + δ4*ln(X4) + δ5*(X5) + δ6*(X6) + μ7*(X4)(X7) + εi
The goal is to see whether the geographic variables exhibit a critical threshold 
Nima Veiseh
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against the institutional variables. 
The regressions provide three important findings. First, while testing the 
interaction of coastline density against the three institutional variables, coastline 
density shows a significant correlation with the institutional indicator of how long 
it should take to start a business.22 This means that countries with greater access 
to the coastline are more likely to have institutions that allow individuals to create 
businesses without significant delays. 
Extending this further, testing the interaction of the ratio of water area to land 
area against the three institutional variables, there is a significant correlation with 
the rule of law.23 Simply put, countries with more access to water may be more 
conducive to political stability. If citizens are not short on basic necessities like 
water, they may be less likely to fight.24
Finally, when testing the interaction of the ratio of waterways to land area 
against the three institutional variables, we see that the interaction terms are only 
significantly correlated to the rule of law and female participation.25
The above interactions and the following analysis reinforce our choice of geo-
graphic and institutional variables, and the existence of a critical threshold.
Figure 1: Life Expectancy as a Function of Income Level
Source: World Bank 2005; World Bank 2007.
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EXISTENCE OF A THRESHOLD
By examining the dynamics of the regressions, we see that there exists a tipping 
point where the model is able to explain part of the variance in income level per 
capita with either geographic or institutional factors. When I constrain my sample 
to non-OPEC countries with incomes greater than $3,400 (see appendix) all of the 
geographic indicators become insignificant at the 5 percent confidence level, with 
only water per land area significant at the 10 percent level. 
This threshold appears arbitrary until we examine indicators that reflect the 
progress of society as a function of income level, i.e., its ability to adopt technology. 
Initially, we see that life expectancy plateaus at the same levels we see in most 
developed countries once a country surpasses an income level of $3,400.
Figure 2: Mobile Phone Subscriptions as a Function of Income Level
Source: World Bank 2005; World Bank 2006.
After a country surpasses an income level of $3,400 per capita, the life expec-
tancy and basic technology level are comparable with more developed countries. 
The income level that marks the transition from lower life expectancy and basic 
technology usage to the same levels enjoyed by wealthier, developed countries is 
the same income threshold that marks the transition of the significance of geo-
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graphic factors explaining income level to institutional factors.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Typical geographic barriers, such as being landlocked, disease burdened, far 
from markets, or possessing deficient soils actually do not determine a country’s 
economic destiny. We have seen that, as the acquisition and use of technology 
advance, these problems can be overcome. The cases 
of Botswana and Dubai show that a country’s ter-
ritory need not be endowed with resources for it to 
achieve sustainable growth. 
The acquisition of technology and eventual estab-
lishment of healthy institutions should be a focus for 
any policymaker seeking economic growth in a devel-
oping country. Policymakers should not, however, 
discount the importance of the geographic landscape 
as a challenge not only to overall development, but 
also to how easy it is to assimilate technology into the country. Policymakers, eco-
nomic or otherwise, should have a firm understanding of technology and the role 
it plays in the economy. In addition, they must understand that the assimilation of 
technology may not be automatic and factors like geography may pose their own 
challenges.
As seen, while geography may not directly determine the aggregate economic 
level—e.g., for Botswana and Dubai—it can set the tipping point for when an 
economy will transform from agrarian to a sustainable manufacturing and service 
system. This tipping point is determined by whether the geography of the territory 
makes it easier or harder to assimilate technology and conduct commerce. As tech-
nology advances in a territory, institutions for the maintenance of urbanization 
and commerce (i.e., sanitation infrastructure and institutions that help support 
business, respectively) will help to elevate the economy to a higher steady state 
level.  
APPENDIX: FURTHER ANALYSIS
I would like to note several areas for further exploration. First, the effects of 
climate on the economy, which have been a part of the studies conducted by both 
Acemoglu and Sachs, were not accounted for in this study. Moreover, finding truly 
exogenous indications of institutional development was not within the scope of this 
project. Lastly, data about income levels do not take into account two important 
issues: poor countries tend to have incomplete data, and countries with forbidding 
geography—such as mountain or deserts—may have an informal economy that is 
A country need 
not be endowed 
with resources 
to achieve 
sustainable 
growth.
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not captured by World Bank income numbers. 
Table 4: Data
Variables # of Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Source
Dependent 
variable:  log of 
income
179 7.971 1.618 4.605 11.110 World Bank Online 
(Atlas Method), 
2007.
Log of ratio of 
waterways to total 
area
184 2.823 2.583 0 8.289 CIA Factbook, 
2005.
Log of ratio of 
water to land area 
200 3.096 32.393 0 12.547 CIA Factbook, 
2005.
Log of ratio of 
coastline to land 
area
198 5.531 3.470 0 13.234 CIA Factbook, 
2005.
Log of average 
time to register 
business
172 3.553 0.845 0.693 6.542 World Bank Online 
(Atlas Method), 
2007.
Rule of law 172 8.872 4.423 1 16 Freedom House 
Institute, 2008.
Percentage of 
parliament seats 
held by females
178 16.687 9.687 0 48.8 World Bank 
Online, 2007.
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